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The pricing, hedging, optimal exercise and optimal cancellation of game or Israeli options
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1. Introduction
The study of game options (also called Israeli options) date back to the seminal
work of Kifer (2000); the recent survey paper by Kifer (2013a) provides a complete
chronology and literature review. In addition to being of interest as derivative se-
curities in their own right, game options have also played an important role in the
study of other derivatives, for example callable options (e.g. Ku¨hn & Kyprianou
2007) and convertible bonds (e.g. Kallsen & Ku¨hn 2005, Bielecki et al. 2008, Wang
& Jin 2009).
A game option is a contract between a writer (the seller) and the holder (the
buyer) whereby a pre-specified payoff is delivered by the seller to the buyer at the
earliest of the exercise time (chosen by the buyer) and the cancellation time (chosen
by the seller). If the game option is cancelled before or at the same time as being
exercised, then the seller also pays a cancellation penalty to the buyer. A game
option is thus essentially an American option with the additional provision that the
seller can cancel the option at any time before expiry, thus forcing early exercise
at a price (the penalty). In practice, this feature tends to reduce costs for both
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the seller and the buyer, which makes game options an attractive alternative to
American options.
It has been well observed that arbitrage pricing of European and American
options in incomplete friction-free models and models with proportional transaction
costs result in a range of arbitrage-free prices, bounded from below by the bid price
and from above by the ask price (see e.g. Fo¨llmer & Schied 2002, Bensaid et al.
1992, Chalasani & Jha 2001, Roux & Zastawniak 2015). The same holds true for
game options (Kallsen & Ku¨hn 2005, Kifer 2013b).
The pricing and hedging of game options in the presence of proportional trans-
action costs also share a number of other important properties with their European
and American counterparts. (The properties for European and American options
mentioned below were all established by Roux & Zastawniak (2015) in a similar
technical setting to the present paper.) Firstly, similar to European options, the
hedging of game options is symmetric in the sense that the hedging problem for the
buyer is exactly the same as the hedging problem for the seller (of a different game
option with related payoff). Kifer (2013b) observed this property in a two-asset
model.
Kifer (2013b) also showed that the probabilistic dual representations of the
bid and ask prices of game options contain so-called randomised stopping times,
a feature shared with the ask price of an American option (for which it was first
observed by Chalasani & Jha 2001). Randomised (or mixed) stopping times have
been studied by Baxter & Chacon (1977) and many others, primarily as an aid to
show the existence and properties of optimal ordinary stopping times. Randomised
stopping times can be thought of as convex combinations of ordinary stopping times
in a well-defined sense. The reason for the appearance of randomised stopping times
in the probabilistic dual representations of the bid and ask prices is that, in the
presence of transaction costs, the most expensive exercise (cancellation) strategy
for the seller (buyer) of a game option to hedge against is not necessarily the same
as the exercise (cancellation) strategy that is most attractive to the buyer (seller).
As a result, it generally costs the seller (buyer) more to hedge against all exercise
(cancellation) strategies than against the best exercise (cancellation) strategy for
the buyer (seller). It turns out that the seller (buyer) must in effect be protected
against a certain randomised exercise (cancellation) time.
Furthermore, similar to a long American option (i.e. the buyer’s case), the pricing
and hedging problems for both the buyer and seller of game option are inherently
non-convex. Thus ideas beyond convex duality are needed to study these problems.
Nevertheless, the link between game options and short American options (i.e. the
seller’s case, a convex problem) means that convex duality methods still have an
important role to play in establishing the probabilistic dual representations.
In this paper we consider the pricing and hedging of game options in the
nume´raire-free discrete-time model of foreign exchange markets introduced by Ka-
banov (1999), where proportional transaction costs are modelled as bid-ask spreads
between currencies. This model has been well studied by Kabanov & Stricker (2001),
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Kabanov et al. (2002), Schachermayer (2004) and others (see also Kabanov & Sa-
farian 2009).
The main aims of our work are twofold. Firstly, we present constructive algo-
rithms for computing optimal exercise and cancellation times together with optimal
hedging strategies for both the buyer and seller of a game option in this model. The
algorithmic constructions in this paper are closely related to previously developed
algorithms for the pricing and hedging of European and American options under
proportional transaction costs (see e.g. Lo¨hne & Rudloff 2014, Roux & Zastawniak
2009, 2015). These existing constructions yield efficient numerical algorithms; in
particular they are known to price path-independent options in polynomial time in
recombinant models (which typically have exponentially-sized state spaces). Numer-
ical examples that illustrate the constructions are provided. Secondly, we establish
probabilistic dual representations for the bid and ask prices of game options. In
both these contributions we extend the recent results of Kifer (2013b) for game
options from two-asset to multi-asset models. Our proofs are rigorous, thus closing
two gaps in the arguments of Kifer (2013b); see Remark 3.3, the comments below
Proposition 3.2 and Example 5.2 for further details.
The methods used in this paper come from convex analysis and dynamic pro-
gramming, and in particular we will use recent results from Roux & Zastawniak
(2015) for an American option with random expiration date. The restriction to
finite state space is motivated by the desire to produce computationally efficient
algorithms for pricing and hedging. The restriction to discrete time is justified by a
recent negative result by Dolinsky (2013) that the super-replication price of a game
option in continuous time under proportional transaction costs is the initial value
of a trivial buy-and-hold superhedging strategy.
The structure of this paper is as follows. Section 2 specifies the currency model
with proportional transaction costs, and reviews various notions concerning ran-
domised stopping times and approximate martingales. The main algorithms for
pricing and hedging together with theoretical results for the seller’s and buyer’s po-
sition are presented in Section 3, with the proofs of all results deferred to Section 4.
Section 5 concludes the paper with three numerical examples.
2. Preliminaries
2.1. Proportional transaction costs
The nume´raire free currency model of Kabanov (1999) has discrete trading dates
t = 0, . . . , T and is based on a finite probability space (Ω,F , P ) with filtration
(Ft)Tt=0. The model contains d currencies (or assets), and at any time t, one unit of
currency j = 1, . . . , d may be obtained by exchanging piijt > 0 units of currency i =
1, . . . , d. We assume that piiit = 1 for i = 1, . . . , d, i.e. every currency may be freely
exchanged for itself.
Assume that the filtration (Ft)Tt=0 is generated by (piijt )Tt=0 for i, j = 1, . . . , d, and
assume for simplicity that F0 = {∅,Ω}, that FT = F = 2Ω and that P (ω) > 0 for
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all ω ∈ Ω. Write Lτ for the family of Fτ -measurable Rd-valued random variables
for every stopping time τ , and write L+τ for the family of non-negative random
variables in Lτ .
Let Ωt be the set of atoms of Ft for t = 0, . . . , T . The elements of Ωt are called the
nodes of the model at time t. A node ν ∈ Ωt+1 is called a successor to a node µ ∈ Ωt
if ν ⊂ µ. The collection of successors of µ is denoted succµ. We shall implicitly and
uniquely identify random variables f in Lt with functions µ 7→ fµ ∈ Rd on Ωt,
and likewise every set A ∈ Lt that we will consider will be implicitly and uniquely
defined by a set-valued mapping µ 7→ Aµ ⊆ Rd on Ωt such that
A = {f ∈ Lt : fµ ∈ Aµ for all µ ∈ Ωt} .
A portfolio x = (x1, . . . , xd) ∈ Lτ is called solvent at a stopping time τ if it can
be exchanged into a portfolio in L+τ without any additional investment, i.e. if there
exist non-negative Fτ -measurable random variables βij for i, j = 1, . . . , d such that
xi +
d∑
j=1
βji −
d∑
j=1
βijpiijτ ≥ 0 for all i = 1, . . . , d.
Write Kτ for the family of solvent portfolios at time τ ; then the solvency cone Kτ
is the convex cone generated by the canonical basis e1, . . . , ed of Rd and the vectors
piijτ e
i − ej for i, j = 1, . . . , d. Observe that Kτ is a polyhedral cone, hence closed.
A self-financing trading strategy y = (yt)
T
t=0 is an R
d-valued predictable process
with initial endowment y0 ∈ L0 satisfying yt − yt+1 ∈ Kt for all t = 0, . . . , T − 1.
Denote the family of self-financing trading strategies by Φ.
A self-financing trading strategy y = (yt) ∈ Φ is called an arbitrage opportunity
if y0 = 0 and there exists some x ∈ L+T \ {0} such that yT −x ∈ KT . This definition
of arbitrage is consistent with (though formally different to) that of Schachermayer
(2004) and Kabanov & Stricker (2001) (who called it weak arbitrage).
For any non-empty convex cone A ⊆ Rd, write A∗ for the positive polar of A, i.e.
A∗ := {x ∈ Rd : x · y ≥ 0 for all y ∈ A}.
Theorem 2.1 (Kabanov & Stricker (2001)). The model is free of arbitrage if
and only if there exists a probability measure P equivalent to P and an Rd-valued
P-martingale S = (St)
T
t=0 such that
St ∈ K∗t \ {0} for t = 0, . . . , T.
Any pair (P, S) satisfying the conditions of Theorem 2.1 is called an equivalent
martingale pair. Denote the family of equivalent martingale pairs by P; then P 6= ∅
in the absence of arbitrage.
Remark 2.1. Theorem 2.1 and the other results in this paper can equivalently be
formulated in terms of consistent pricing processes (Zt)
T
t=0 where
Zt = StEP
(
dP
dP
∣∣∣∣Ft
)
for all t = 0, . . . , T.
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Schachermayer (2004 pp. 24–25) provides further details on this equivalence.
Assume for the remainder of this paper that the model contains no arbitrage.
2.2. Randomised stopping times
Definition 2.1 (Randomised stopping time). A randomised (or mixed) stop-
ping time χ = (χt)
T
t=0 is an adapted nonnegative process satisfying
T∑
t=0
χt = 1.
Denote the set of randomised stopping times by X , and the set of (ordinary)
stopping times with values in 0, . . . , T by T . Every stopping time τ ∈ T corresponds
to a randomised stopping time χτ = (χτt )
T
t=0 defined as
χτt := 1{τ=t} for t = 0, . . . , T,
where 1 is the indicator function on Ω. The set X is the convex hull of {χτ : τ ∈ T }
and so X can be thought of as the linear relaxation of the set of ordinary stopping
times in this sense.
Fix any process A = (At)
T
t=0 and randomised stopping time χ ∈ X . Define the
processes χ∗ = (χ∗t )
T
t=0 and A
χ∗ = (Aχ∗t )
T
t=0 by
χ∗t :=
T∑
s=t
χs, A
χ∗
t :=
T∑
s=t
χsAs
for t = 0, . . . , T . For convenience also define χ∗T+1 := 0 and A
χ∗
T+1 := 0. Observe
that χ∗ is a predictable process since
χ∗t = 1−
t−1∑
s=0
χs for t = 1, . . . , T.
The value of A at χ is defined as
Aχ := A
χ∗
0 =
T∑
t=0
χtAt.
Observe that if χ = χτ for some τ ∈ T , then
χτ∗t = 1{τ≥t}, A
χτ∗
t =
T∑
s=t
1{τ=s}As = Aτ1{τ≥t}
for t = 0, . . . , T , and in particular Aχτ = Aτ .
Definition 2.2 (Approximate martingale pair). Fix any χ ∈ X . A pair (P, S)
consisting of a probability measure P and an adapted Rd-valued process S is called
a χ-approximate martingale pair if
St ∈ K∗t \ {0}, EP(Sχ∗t+1|Ft) ∈ K∗t
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for all t = 0, . . . , T . If P is in addition equivalent to P , then (P, S) is called a
χ-approximate equivalent martingale pair.
Denote the family of χ-approximate equivalent pairs (P, S) by P(χ) and the set
of χ-approximate pairs by P¯(χ). For any χ ∈ X and i = 1, . . . , d define
Pi(χ) := {(P, S) ∈ P(χ) : Sit = 1 for t = 0, . . . , T},
P¯i(χ) := {(P, S) ∈ P¯(χ) : Sit = 1 for t = 0, . . . , T}.
Since P ⊆ P(χ) ⊆ P¯(χ) and K∗t is a cone for all t = 0, . . . , T , the no-arbitrage
assumption implies that Pi(χ) and P¯i(χ) are non-empty.
Definition 2.3 (Truncated stopping time). Fix any χ ∈ X , σ ∈ T . The trun-
cated randomised stopping time χ ∧ σ = ((χ ∧ σ)t)Tt=0 is defined as
(χ ∧ σ)t := χt1{t<σ} + χ∗t1{t=σ} for t = 0, . . . , T.
The process χ ∧ σ is adapted and nonnegative, and moreover
T∑
t=0
(χ ∧ σ)t =
σ−1∑
t=0
χt + χ
∗
σ = 1,
so it is indeed a randomised stopping time. If χ = χτ for some τ ∈ T , then clearly
(χ ∧ σ)t = 1{σ∧τ=t} for all t = 0, . . . , T , and so χτ ∧ σ = χτ∧σ. Denote the set of
randomised stopping times truncated at σ ∈ T by
X ∧ σ := {χ ∧ σ : χ ∈ X}.
3. Main Results and Discussion
In this section we formally define what we mean by a game option, and present the
constructions and main results.
Definition 3.1 (Game option). A game option is a derivative security that is
exercised at a stopping time τ ∈ T chosen by the buyer and cancelled at a stopping
time σ ∈ T chosen by the seller. At time σ ∧ τ the buyer receives the payoff Qστ
from the seller, where
Qst ≡ QY,X,X
′
st := Yt1{s>t} +Xs1{s<t} +X
′
s1{s=t} (3.1)
for all s, t = 0, . . . , T , and Y = (Yt)
T
t=0, X = (Xt)
T
t=0 and X
′ = (X ′t)
T
t=0 are adapted
R
d-valued processes such that
Xt −X ′t ∈ Kt, X ′t − Yt ∈ Kt (3.2)
for all t = 0, . . . , T .
In the event that the buyer exercises before the option is cancelled, i.e. on
{τ < σ}, the buyer receives the payoff Yτ from the seller at his exercise time τ .
If the seller cancels the option before it is exercised, i.e. on {σ < τ}, the seller is
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required to deliver the payoff Xσ to the buyer at the cancellation time σ, which
consists of Yσ and a penalty
Xσ − Yσ = (Xσ −X ′σ) + (X ′σ − Yσ) ∈ Kσ.
In the event that the option is exercised and cancelled simultaneously, i.e. on {σ =
τ}, the seller pays X ′σ to the buyer, consisting of Yσ and a penalty X ′σ − Yσ ∈ Kσ.
The assumptions (3.2) mean that, at any time t, the portfolio Xt payable on cancel-
lation is at least as attractive to the buyer as the portfolio X ′t payable in the event
of simultaneous cancellation and exercise, which in turn is at least as attractive as
the portfolio Yt payable on exercise. It is therefore clear from Definition 3.1 that
a game option is essentially an American option with payoff process Y with the
additional feature that it may be cancelled by the seller at any time (upon payment
of a cancellation penalty).
Remark 3.1. Definition 3.1 is slightly more general than the usual approach fol-
lowed in the literature (see e.g. Kifer 2000, 2013b), where the standard assumption
is that no penalty is paid if cancellation and exercise takes place simultaneously
(i.e. X ′t = Yt for all t) and that no penalty is paid on maturity (i.e. XT = X
′
T = YT ).
The motivation for the generalization in the present paper is that it enables elegant
exploitation of the symmetry between the seller’s and buyer’s hedging problems;
see Proposition 3.2. Nevertheless, from a practical point of view, the pricing and
hedging problems depend on X only through (Xt)t<T and on X
′ only through X ′T ;
see the key Constructions 3.1 and 3.3 as well as Lemma 4.1.
Remark 3.2. The property (3.2) imposes an ordering on the payoffs in the various
scenarios for the seller and buyer, but there is no requirement in Definition 3.1 that
any of the payoffs Xt, Yt and X
′
t should be solvent portfolios. The absence of such a
solvency requirement makes it easy to adapt to the buyer’s case, where in practice
the payoffs tend to be “negative” in that they correspond to portfolios received
rather than delivered. Typical cases are illustrated in Examples 5.1 and 5.2.
3.1. Pricing and hedging for the seller
A hedging strategy for the seller of a game option (Y,X,X ′) comprises a cancellation
time σ and a self-financing trading strategy y that allows the seller to deliver the
payoff without risk of loss.
Definition 3.2 (Hedging strategy for the seller). A hedging strategy for the
seller is a pair (σ, y) ∈ T × Φ satisfying
yσ∧τ −Qστ ∈ Kσ∧τ for all τ ∈ T . (3.3)
There exists at least one hedging strategy for the seller. Indeed, fixing i = 1, . . . , d
and defining
m := max


d∑
j=1
piijt (ω)max{|Y jt (ω)|, |Xjt (ω)|, |X ′jt (ω)|} : t = 0, . . . , T, ω ∈ Ω

 ,
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the (possibly expensive) buy-and-hold strategy y = (yt)
T
t=0 with yt = me
i for
t = 0, . . . , T hedges the game option for the seller with any choice of the cancellation
time σ ∈ T .
Consider now the following construction.
Construction 3.1. Construct adapted set-valued mappings (Yat )Tt=0, (X at )Tt=0,
(Uat )Tt=0, (Vat )Tt=0, (Wat )Tt=0, (Zat )Tt=0 as follows. For all t = 0, . . . , T let
Yat := Yt +Kt, X at :=
{
X ′T +KT if t = T,
Xt +Kt if t < T.
(3.4)
Define
WaT := VaT := LT , ZaT := X aT .
For t = T − 1, . . . , 0 define by backward iteration
Wat := Zat+1 ∩ Lt, (3.5)
Vat :=Wat +Kt, (3.6)
Zat := (Vat ∩ Yat ) ∪ X at . (3.7)
For each t = 0, . . . , T , the set Yat is the collection of portfolios in Lt that allows
the seller to settle the option in the event that the buyer exercises at time t and the
seller does not cancel the option at time t. The set X at is the collection of portfolios
that allows the seller to settle the option upon cancellation at time t, irrespective
of whether the buyer exercises at time t or not. The property (3.2) gives that
X at = (Xt +Kt) ∩ (X ′t +Kt) for t < T.
The relation X aT = X ′T +KT follows from the fact that any cancellation at the final
time T must be matched by simultaneous exercise.
The following result shows that Za0 is the set of initial endowments that allow
the seller to hedge the game option.
Proposition 3.1. We have
Za0 = {y0 : (σ, y) hedges (Y,X,X ′) for the seller}. (3.8)
It is demonstrated in the proof of Proposition 3.1, which is deferred to Section 4,
that for each t < T the sets Vat , Wat and Zat have natural interpretations that are
important to the seller of the option. The set Wat consists of those portfolios at
time t that allow the seller to hedge the option in the future (at time t+1 or later),
and Vat consists of those portfolios that may be rebalanced at time t into a portfolio
in Wat . The set Zat consists of all portfolios that allow the seller to settle the option
at time t or any time in the future without risk of loss.
Construction 3.1 is essentially an iteration (backwards in time) over the nodes
of the price tree generated by the exchange rates; note in particular that (3.5) could
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equivalently be written as
Waµt :=
⋂
ν∈succµ
Zaνt+1 for µ ∈ Ωt. (3.5′)
This property makes the construction particularly efficient for recombinant models,
for which the number of nodes grow only polynomially with the number of steps in
the model, despite the state space growing exponentially.
The sets X at and Yat in Construction 3.1 are clearly polyhedral and non-empty
for all t = 0, . . . , T , as are VaT , WaT and ZaT . The operations in Construction 3.1 are
direct addition of polyhedral cones in (3.4) and (3.6), intersection in (3.5) and (3.7),
and union in (3.7). The appearance of the union in (3.7) means that the sets Vat ,Wat
and Zat may be non-convex for some t < T . However, it is clear that these sets can
be written as the finite union of non-empty (closed) polyhedra, and are therefore
closed. In particular the closedness of Za0 is essential to Theorem 3.2 below.
The ask price of the game option in terms of any currency is defined as the
infimal initial endowment in that currency that would allow the seller to hedge the
game option without risk.
Definition 3.3 (Ask price). The ask price or seller’s price or upper hedging price
of a game option (Y,X,X ′) at time 0 in terms of currency i = 1, . . . , d is
piai (Y,X,X
′) := inf{z ∈ R : (σ, y) ∈ T × Φ with y0 = zei
hedges (Y,X,X ′) for the seller}.
The existence of the buy-and-hold strategy for the seller means that the ask
price is well defined. We now present a dual representation for the ask price in
terms of randomised stopping times and approximate martingale pairs.
Theorem 3.1. The ask price of a game option (Y,X,X ′) in terms of currency
i = 1, . . . , d is
piai (Y,X,X
′) = min
σ∈T
max
χ∈X
sup
(P,S)∈Pi(χ∧σ)
EP((Qσ· · Sσ∧·)χ)
= min
σ∈T
max
χ∈X
max
(P,S)∈P¯i(χ∧σ)
EP((Qσ· · Sσ∧·)χ),
where Qσ· · Sσ∧· denotes the process (Qσt · Sσ∧t)Tt=0, in other words,
(Qσ· · Sσ∧·)χ =
σ−1∑
t=0
χtYt · St + χ∗σ+1Xσ · Sσ + χσX ′σ · Sσ.
The proof of Theorem 3.1 appears in Section 4.
Remark 3.3. Kifer (2013b Theorem 3.1) obtained a similar dual representation
for a game option (Y,X, Y ) in a two-currency model, that does not feature the
truncated stopping time χ ∧ σ and stopped process Sσ∧·, but rather χ and S.
Example 5.2 demonstrates that these dual representations are not equivalent in
general and that the representation in Theorem 3.1 is indeed the correct one.
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The reason for the difference between the two representations can be explained
intuitively in the following way. The proof of Theorem 3.1 hinges on the fact that a
pair (σ, y) hedges the game option for the seller if and only if y hedges an American
option with payoff process Hσ (defined in (4.1)) and random expiration date σ for
the seller. By contrast, the proof of Theorem 3.1 of Kifer (2013b) claims that (σ, y)
hedges the game option (Y,X, Y ) for the seller if and only if y hedges an American
option with payoff process (QY,X,Yσt )
T
t=0 and expiration date T (rather than σ) for the
seller. This claim does not hold true in general, because hedging such an American
option would require the seller to be in a position to deliver Qσt = Xσ on {σ > t} at
any time t, in other words, after the option has already been cancelled. As evidenced
in Example 5.2, the non-equivalence is most easily noticed when transaction costs
are large at time σ and/or Xσ is a non-solvent portfolio.
Returning to the problem of computing the ask price of a game option, the
following result is a direct consequence of Proposition 3.1 and the closedness of Za0 .
Theorem 3.2. We have
piai (Y,X,X
′) = min{x ∈ R : xei ∈ Za0 }. (3.9)
Moreover, there exists a hedging strategy (σˆ, yˆ) for the seller such that yˆ0 =
piai (Y,X,X
′)ei.
A hedging strategy (σ, y) for the seller is called optimal if it satisfies the proper-
ties in Theorem 3.2. A procedure for constructing such a strategy can be extracted
from the proof of Proposition 3.1.
Construction 3.2. Construct an optimal strategy (σˆ, yˆ) for the seller as follows.
Let
yˆ0 := pi
a
i (Y,X,X
′)ei.
For each t = 0, . . . , T − 1 and µ ∈ Ωt, if yˆµt ∈ Zaµt \ X aµt , then choose any
yˆµt+1 ∈ Waµt ∩ [yˆµt −Kµt ] , (3.10)
otherwise put yˆµt+1 := yˆ
µ
t . Also define
σˆ := min {t : yˆt ∈ X at } .
The optimal strategy for the seller is not unique in general; this is reflected in
the choice (3.10). In practice the seller might use secondary considerations, such as
a preference for holding certain currencies over others, or optimality of a secondary
hedging criterion, to guide the construction of a suitable optimal hedging strategy.
Two toy examples illustrating Constructions 3.1 and 3.2 and Theorem 3.1, as
well as a third example with a more realistic flavour can be found in Section 5.
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3.2. Pricing and hedging for the buyer
Consider now the hedging, pricing and optimal exercise problem for the buyer of a
game option (Y,X,X ′).
Definition 3.4 (Hedging strategy for the buyer). A hedging strategy for the
buyer is a pair (τ, y) ∈ T × Φ satisfying
yσ∧τ +Qστ ∈ Kσ∧τ for all σ ∈ T , (3.11)
where the payoff process Q is defined in (3.1).
Observe from (3.1) that
Qστ = Q
Y,X,X′
στ = −Q−X,−Y,−X
′
τσ for all σ, τ ∈ T , (3.12)
and moreover from (3.2) that for all t = 0, . . . , T
−Yt − (−X ′t) = X ′t − Yt ∈ Kt,
−X ′t − (−Xt) = Xt −X ′t ∈ Kt.
Thus if (Y,X,X ′) is the payoff of a game option, then so is (−X,−Y,−X ′), and
(3.11) is equivalent to
yτ∧σ −Q−X,−Y,−X′τσ ∈ Kτ∧σ for all σ ∈ T .
Thus we arrive at the following result.
Proposition 3.2. A pair (τ, y) ∈ T ×Φ hedges the game option (Y,X,X ′) for the
buyer if and only if (τ, y) hedges the game option (−X,−Y,−X ′) for the seller.
This symmetry means that the results and constructions developed in the pre-
vious section for the seller’s case can also be applied to the hedging and pricing
problem for the buyer, thus substantiating the claim by Kifer (2013b pp. 679–80).
In particular, Construction 3.1 can be applied directly, provided that Yat and X at in
(3.4) is redefined to take into account the fact that the option is now (−X,−Y,−X ′)
rather than (Y,X,X ′). The resulting construction reads as follows.
Construction 3.3. For all t let
Ybt := −Xt +Kt, X bt :=
{
−X ′T +KT if t = T,
−Yt +Kt if t < T.
Define
WbT := VbT := LT , ZbT := X bT .
For t = T − 1, . . . , 0 let
Wbt := Zbt+1 ∩ Lt, Vbt :=Wbt +Kbt , Zbt := (Vbt ∩ Ybt ) ∪ X bt .
It follows directly from Theorem 3.1 that Zb0 is the set of initial endowments
that allow the buyer to hedge the option, i.e.
Zb0 = {z : (τ, y) ∈ T × Φ with y0 = zei hedges (Y,X,X ′) for the buyer}.
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The bid price of a game option in any currency is the largest amount that the
buyer can raise in that currency at time 0 by using the payoff of the option as a
guarantee.
Definition 3.5 (Bid price). The bid price or lower hedging price or buyer’s price
of a game option (Y,X,X ′) in currency i = 1, . . . , d is defined as
pibi (Y,X,X
′) := sup{−z : (τ, y) ∈ T × Φ with y0 = zei
superhedges (Y,X,X ′) for the buyer}.
Proposition 3.2 and Construction 3.3 give that
pibi (Y,X,X
′) = −piai (−X,−Y,−X ′) = − inf
{
z : zei ∈ Zb0
}
. (3.13)
A hedging strategy (τ, y) for the buyer is called optimal if y0 = −pibi (Y,X,X ′)ei.
Optimal hedging strategies can be generated by rewriting Construction 3.2 as fol-
lows.
Construction 3.4. Construct an optimal strategy (τˇ , yˇ) for the buyer as follows.
Let
yˇ0 := −pibi (Y,X,X ′)ei.
For each t = 0, . . . , T − 1 and µ ∈ Ωt, if yˇµt ∈ Zbµt \ X bµt , then choose any
yˇµt+1 ∈ Wbµt ∩ [yˇµt −Kµt ] , (3.14)
otherwise put yˇµt+1 := yˇ
µ
t . Also define
τˇ := min
{
t : yˇt ∈ X bt
}
.
A toy example illustrating Constructions 3.3 and 3.4 can be found in Section 5.
It demonstrates that the optimal cancellation time σˆ for the seller and the optimal
exercise time τˇ for the buyer are not the same in general, and these times may also
be different from the stopping time σˆ ∧ τˇ at which the option payoff is paid.
Finally, combining Theorem 3.1 with (3.12) and (3.13) immediately gives the
following dual representation for the bid price.
Theorem 3.3. We have
pibi (Y,X,X
′) = max
τ∈T
min
χ∈X
inf
(P,S)∈Pi(χ∧τ)
EP((Q·τ · S·∧τ )χ)
= max
τ∈T
min
χ∈X
min
(P,S)∈P¯i(χ∧τ)
EP((Q·τ · S·∧τ )χ),
where Q·τ · S·∧τ denotes the process (QY,X,X′sτ · Ss∧τ )Ts=0, i.e.
(Q·τ · S·∧τ )χ =
τ−1∑
s=0
χsXs · Ss + χ∗τ+1Yτ · Sτ + χτX ′τ · Sτ .
The representation in Theorem 3.3 is different from the representation by Kifer
(2013b Theorem 3.1) for a game option (Y,X,X ′) in a two-currency model, for
reasons already discussed in the context of Theorem 3.1; see Remark 3.3.
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4. Proofs
Proof. [Proposition 3.1] Fix any z ∈ Za0 . We claim that there exists a hedging
strategy (σ, y) for the seller with y0 = z. To this end, we construct y = (yt)
T
t=0
together with a non-decreasing sequence (σt)
T
t=0 of stopping times. Define
y0 := z, σ0 :=
{
0 if z ∈ X a0 ,
1 if z ∈ Za0 \ X a0 .
If σ0 = 0, let y1 := y0. If σ0 = 1, then
y0 ∈ Za0 \ X a0 ⊆ Va0 ∩ Ya0 ⊆ Wa0 +K0,
so that there exists some y1 ∈ Wa0 such that y0 − y1 ∈ K0 and y1 ∈ Za1 .
Suppose by induction that for some t > 0 we have constructed y0, . . . , yt and
non-decreasing σ0, . . . , σt−1 such that for s = 0, . . . , t − 1 we have ys+1 being Fs-
measurable, σs ≤ s + 1, ys − ys+1 ∈ Ks, yσs ∈ X aσs on {σs ≤ s} and yu ∈ Zau \ X au
on {σs > u} for all u = 0, . . . , s. Define
σt := σt−11{σt−1<t} + t1{σt−1=t}∩{yt∈Xat } + (t+ 1)1{σt−1=t}∩{yt∈Zat \Xat }.
On the set
{σt > t} = {σt = t+ 1} = {σt−1 = t} ∩ {yt ∈ Zat \ X at }
we have
yt ∈ Zat \ X at ⊆ Vat ∩ Yat ⊆ Vat =Wat +Kt,
so there exists an Ft-measurable random variable x ∈ Zat+1 such that yt − x ∈ Kt
on this set. Now define the Ft-measurable random variable
yt+1 := x1{σt=t+1} + yt1{σt≤t}.
Since 0 ∈ Kt we have yt − yt+1 ∈ Kt. Moreover,
yσt = yσt1{σt<t} + yt1{σt=t} + yt+11{σt=t+1}
= yσt−11{σt<t} + yt1{σt−1=t}∩{yt∈Xat } + yt+11{σt=t+1}
so yσt ∈ X aσt on the set
{σt ≤ t} = {σt−1 < t} ∪ [{σt−1 = t} ∩ {yt ∈ X at }].
This concludes the inductive step.
Let σ := σT ; then the pair (σ, y) ∈ T × Φ satisfies
yσ ∈ X aσ , yt ∈ Zat \ X at on {t < σ} for t = 0, . . . , T − 1.
Fix any stopping time τ . On {τ < σ} we have
yτ ∈ Zaτ \ X aτ ⊆ Vaτ ∩ Yτ ⊆ Yτ = Yτ +Kτ .
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On the set {τ = σ} we have yσ ∈ X aσ ⊆ X ′σ + Kσ. On the set {τ > σ} we have
σ < τ ≤ T and yσ ∈ X aσ = Xσ + Kσ. Thus yσ∧τ − Qστ ∈ Kσ∧τ , from which it
follows that (σ, y) hedges the game option for the seller.
Conversely, suppose that (σ, y) hedges the game option for the seller. We show
by backward induction that yt ∈ Zat on {t ≤ σ} and yt ∈ Vat ∩Yat on {t < σ} for all
t = 0, . . . , T , from which it can be deduced that z = y0 ∈ Za0 , which completes the
proof. At time T we have {T = σ} = {T ≤ σ}, so clearly yT ∈ X ′T +KT = X aT = ZaT
on {T ≤ σ}.
For any t < T , suppose that yt+1 ∈ Zat+1 on {t+1 ≤ σ} = {t < σ}. This means
that yt+1 ∈ Wat on {t < σ} as yt+1 ∈ Lt. Moreover yt − yt+1 ∈ Kt implies that
yt ∈ Vat on {t < σ}, and therefore
yt ∈ Vat ∩ [Qσt +Kt] = Vat ∩ [Yt +Kt] = Vat ∩ Yat ⊆ Zat on {t < σ}.
On the set {t = σ} = {t ≤ σ} \ {t < σ} we have
yt ∈ QtT +Kt = Xt +Kt = X at ⊆ Zat .
This concludes the induction.
The next result will play an important role in the proof of Theorem 3.1. Define
the auxiliary process
Hst ≡ H(Y,X,X
′)
st := Yt1{s>t} +Xs1{s=t<T} +X
′
s1{s=t=T} (4.1)
for all s, t = 0, . . . , T . Observe that the process Hσ = (Hσt)
T
t=0 is adapted for any
σ ∈ T , and that Hσt = Qσt = Yt on {σ > t} and Hσt = 0 on {σ < t} for all
t = 0, . . . , T .
The payoff Hσt can be interpreted as the payoff that a seller with pre-selected
cancellation time σ needs to be prepared to deliver at time t if it is known that the
buyer will not exercise at the same time as when the option is cancelled (except
at time t = T ); this is effectively the worst case scenario for such a seller because
of (3.2).
Lemma 4.1. A pair (σ, y) ∈ T × Φ hedges the game option for the seller if and
only if
yσ∧τ −Hστ ∈ Kσ∧τ for all τ ∈ T . (4.2)
Proof. Throughout the proof we shall make frequent and implicit use of the fact
that Kt is a pointed cone for all t, and in particular the property 0 ∈ Kt.
Fix any (σ, y) ∈ T × Φ satisfying (4.2). In view of (4.1), this implies that
(yσ∧τ − Yσ∧τ )1{σ>τ} ∈ Kσ∧τ for all τ ∈ T , (4.3)
(yσ −Xσ)1{σ=τ<T} ∈ Kσ∧τ for all τ ∈ T , (4.4)
(yσ −X ′σ)1{σ=τ=T} ∈ Kσ∧τ . for all τ ∈ T , (4.5)
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Substituting τ = 0, . . . , T − 1 into (4.4) and τ = T into (4.5) gives
(yσ −Xσ)1{σ<T} ∈ Kσ, (4.6)
(yσ −X ′σ)1{σ=T} ∈ Kσ. (4.7)
Property (3.2) together with (4.6)–(4.7) then leads to yσ −X ′σ ∈ Kσ, whence
(yσ∧τ −X ′σ∧τ )1{σ=τ} = (yσ −X ′σ)1{σ=τ}
∈ 1{σ=τ}Kσ = 1{σ=τ}Kσ∧τ ⊆ Kσ∧τ for all τ ∈ T . (4.8)
It also follows from (4.6) that
(yσ∧τ −Xσ∧τ )1{σ<τ} = (yσ −Xσ)1{σ<τ} = (yσ −Xσ)1{σ<T}1{σ<τ}
∈ 1{σ<τ}Kσ = 1{σ<τ}Kσ∧τ ⊆ Kσ∧τ for all τ ∈ T . (4.9)
Properties (4.3), (4.8) and (4.9) lead to (3.3), and so (σ, y) hedges the game option
for the seller.
Suppose conversely that (σ, y) ∈ T × Φ hedges the game option for the seller.
Property (3.3) gives (4.3) and (upon choosing τ = T )
yσ −Xσ1{σ<T} −X ′σ1{σ=T} ∈ Kσ,
from which it follows that
(yσ∧τ −Xσ)1{σ=τ<T} + (yσ∧τ −X ′σ)1{σ=τ=T}
= yσ∧τ1{σ=τ} −Xσ1{σ=τ<T} −X ′σ1{σ=τ=T}
=
(
yσ∧τ −Xσ1{σ<T} −X ′σ1{σ=T}
)
1{σ=τ}
=
(
yσ −Xσ1{σ<T} −X ′σ1{σ=T}
)
1{σ=τ}
∈ 1{σ=τ}Kσ = 1{σ=τ}Kσ∧τ ⊆ Kσ∧τ for all τ ∈ T . (4.10)
Properties (4.3) and (4.10) together give (4.2), which completes the proof.
Proof. [Theorem 3.1] Lemma 4.1 shows that, for σ ∈ T given, the pair (σ, y) ∈
T × Φ hedges the game option (Y,X,X ′) for the seller if and only if (4.2) holds,
equivalently
yτ −Hστ ∈ Kτ for all τ ∈ T such that τ ≤ σ.
Definition 3.3 and the finiteness of T then give that
piai (Y,X,X
′)
= min
σ∈T
inf{z ∈ R : (σ, y) hedges (Y,X,X ′) for the seller and y0 = zei}
= min
σ∈T
pai (σ),
where
pai (σ) := inf{z ∈ R : y ∈ Φ such that
y0 = ze
i, yτ −Hστ ∈ Kτ for all τ ∈ T , τ ≤ σ}. (4.11)
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This means that any pair (σ, y) hedges the game option (Y,X,X ′) for the seller
if and only if, in the terminology of Roux & Zastawniak (2015), the strategy y
superhedges an option with payoff process Hσ = (Hσt)
T
t=0 that can be exercised by
the buyer at any stopping time τ satisfying
{τ = t} ⊆ Et := {t ≤ σ} for all t = 0, . . . , T
for the seller. Intuitively, this is an American option with (random) expiration date
σ. The quantity pai (σ) in (4.11) is the ask price of such an option in asset i, and
Roux & Zastawniak (2015 Theorem 3) established that
pai (σ) = max
χ∈XE
sup
(P,S)∈Pi(χ)
EP((Hσ · S)χ) = max
χ∈XE
max
(P,S)∈P¯i(χ)
EP((Hσ · S)χ)
where Hσ · S = (Hσt · St)Tt=0 and
X E := {χ ∈ X : {χt > 0} ⊆ Et for all t = 0, . . . , T} = X ∧ σ.
It then follows that
pai (σ) = max
χ∈X
sup
(P,S)∈Pi(χ∧σ)
EP((Hσ · S)χ∧σ) = max
χ∈X
max
(P,S)∈P¯i(χ∧σ)
EP((Hσ · S)χ∧σ),
(4.12)
so that
piai (Y,X,X
′) = min
σ∈T
max
χ∈X
sup
(P,S)∈Pi(χ∧σ)
EP((Hσ · S)χ∧σ)
= min
σ∈T
max
χ∈X
max
(P,S)∈P¯i(χ∧σ)
EP((Hσ · S)χ∧σ). (4.13)
Fix now any σ ∈ T , χ ∈ X and (P, S) ∈ P¯(χ ∧ σ) and note that
(Hσ · S)χ∧σ
= (Qσ· · Sσ∧·)χ + (χ∗σ1{σ<T} − χ∗σ+1)Xσ · Sσ + (χ∗σ1{σ=T} − χσ)X ′σ · Sσ
= (Qσ· · Sσ∧·)χ +
(
χσ1{σ<T} − χ∗σ+11{σ=T}
)
Xσ · Sσ − χσ1{σ<T}X ′σ · Sσ
= (Qσ· · Sσ∧·)χ + χσ1{σ<T}(Xσ −X ′σ) · Sσ. (4.14)
This follows from the properties of χ∗: in particular χ∗T+1 = 0, χ
∗
T = χT and
χ∗σ = χ
∗
σ+1 + χσ. Since Xσ −X ′σ ∈ Kσ by (3.2) and Sσ ∈ K∗σ, we immediately have
(Hσ · S)χ∧σ ≥ (Qσ· · Sσ∧·)χ. (4.15)
Define the stopping time χ′ = (χ′t) ∈ X by
χ′t := χt1{t<σ} + χ
∗
σ1{t=T} for t = 0, . . . , T ;
then χ ∧ σ = χ′ ∧ σ and so (P, S) ∈ P¯(χ′ ∧ σ). Moreover, since χ′σ1{σ<T} = 0 it
follows from (4.14) that
(Hσ · S)χ∧σ = (Hσ · S)χ′∧σ = (Qσ· · Sσ∧·)χ′ . (4.16)
Combining (4.15) and (4.16) then gives
max
χ∈X
max
(P,S)∈P¯i(χ∧σ)
EP((Hσ · S)χ∧σ) = max
χ∈X
max
(P,S)∈P¯i(χ∧σ)
EP((Qσ· · Sσ∧·)χ),
and the result follows from (4.13).
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Fig. 1. Game option in binary two-step two-currency model, Example 5.1
5. Numerical Examples
Three numerical examples are presented in this section. The first is a toy example
to illustrate the constructions in Section 3. The second illustrates Theorem 3.1 and
serves as a minimal counterexample to Theorem 3.1 of Kifer (2013b). The final
example has a more realistic flavour.
Example 5.1. A game option (Y,X,X ′) in a binary two-step two-currency model
is presented in Figure 1. The model is recombinant and has transaction costs only
at node u at time 1, and the option is path-independent and has no cancellation
penalties at time 2.
Let us use Construction 3.1 to find the set of hedging endowments for the seller.
Clearly
Zauu2 =
{(
x1, x2
) ∈ R2 : 16x1 + x2 ≥ 9} ,
Zaud2 =
{(
x1, x2
) ∈ R2 : 10x1 + x2 ≥ 4} ,
Zadd2 =
{(
x1, x2
) ∈ R2 : 4x1 + x2 ≥ 0}
at time t = 2.
For time t = 1, consider the node u. We obtain Wau1 from (3.5′) and Vau1 from
(3.6); both procedures are shown graphically in Figure 2. Observe that the magni-
tude of the transaction costs at this node means that Wau1 + Ku1 = Wau1 , whence
Vau1 =Wau1 . The next step is to compute Zau1 from (3.7). As shown in Figure 2, this
can be done by finding the intersection of Vau1 and Yau1 first and then taking the
union with X au1 . The non-convexity of Zau1 is due to the magnitude of the trans-
action costs and the shape of the payoff at this node. Similar considerations at the
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node d give that
Zad1 = X ad1 =
{(
x1, x2
)
: 6x1 + x2 ≥ 1} . (5.1)
Finally, following the same steps for time t = 0 results in the sets of portfolios
Wa0 , Va0 and Za0 depicted in Figure 3. The ask prices of the game option in the two
currencies are the intersections of the lower boundary of Za0 with the axes, and so
can be read directly from the final graph in Figure 3, namely
pia1 (Y,X,X
′) = 25 , pi
a
2 (Y,X,X
′) = 4.
Consider now the buyer’s case. Observe in the context of Remark 3.2 that
(−X,−Y,−X ′) satisfies the conditions of Definition 3.1, even though some of the
payoff portfolios are not solvent, for example, −X0 = (0,−5) /∈ K0. Construction 3.3
and similar calculations as in the seller’s case yield
Zb0 =
{(
x1, x2
) ∈ R2 : 6x1 + x2 ≥ − 115 }
and the bid prices
pib1(Y,X,X
′) = 1150 , pi
b
2(Y,X,X
′) = 115 .
Let us use Construction 3.4 to find an optimal hedging strategy (τˇ , yˇ) for the
buyer in the scenario uu from the initial value yˇ0 :=
(
0,− 115
)
. Clearly yˇ0 /∈ X b0 = K0
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and so τˇ > 0. As can be seen from Figure 4,
Wb0 ∩ [yˇ0 −K0] =
{(− 310 , 45)}
and so yˇ1 =
(− 310 , 45) by (3.14). Observing that
yˇ1 /∈ X bu1 =
{(
x1, x2
) ∈ R2 : 16x1 + x2 ≥ −3, 8x1 + x2 ≥ −3} ,
in other words that τˇ(uu) > 1, we proceed to select yˇu2 . Figure 4 also shows that
Wbu1 ∩ [yˇ1 −Ku1 ] = conv
{
yˇ1,
(− 3740 , 295 ) , (− 56 , 133 ) , (0,−4)} ,
so there is some freedom in the selection of yˇu2 . In fact
Wbu1 ∩ [yˇ1 −Ku1 ] ⊆ X buu2 =
{(
x1, x2
) ∈ R2 : 16x1 + x2 ≥ −9} ,
which means that every choice of yˇu2 ∈ Wbu1 ∩ [yˇ1 −Ku1 ] would enable the buyer to
exercise the option at time 2 at the node uu and remain in (or return to) a solvent
position. It is also clear that τˇ(uu) = 2.
Returning to the seller, it is straightforward to use Construction 3.2 to create an
optimal hedging strategy (σˆ, yˆ) for the seller from the initial endowment yˆ0 := (0, 4).
From Figure 3 it is clear that yˆ0 /∈ X a0 (and so σˆ > 0), and also that
Wa0 ∩ [yˆ0 −K0] = {(0, 4)} = {yˆ0} ,
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Fig. 5. Game option in binary single-step two-currency model, Example 5.2
and so by (3.10) we must choose yˆ1 := yˆ0. Figure 2 and (5.1) shows that yˆ1 /∈ X a1
and so σˆ = 1. This means that if the seller follows (σˆ, yˆ) and the buyer (τˇ , yˇ), then
in scenario uu the option will be cancelled (but not exercised) at the node u, at
which time the seller delivers (0, 4) to the buyer.
Example 5.2. Figure 5 presents a game option (Y,X, Y ) in a binary single-step
two-currency model. The option satisfies Definition 3.1 despite the fact that neither
Y0 nor X0 are solvent at time 0 (cf. Remark 3.2).
It would be tempting for the seller to cancel the option at time 0, because
delivering X0 to the buyer at time 0 is effectively the same as receiving the portfolio
(15,−1), which the seller could immediately convert into
15− pi120 = 2 > 0
units of currency 1. If the buyer exercises at time 0 then the seller is in an even
better position, because −Y0 could similarly be converted into 7 units of currency 1.
Applying Construction 3.1 to (Y,X, Y ) gives the set Za0 presented in Figure 6.
Clearly
pia1 (Y,X, Y ) = −2,
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Za
0
−15 −2 25 84
−7
− 27
13
1
x1
x2
z0
−15
−2
25
84
−7 − 27
13
1
x2
x1
Fig. 6. Za
0
and z0, Example 5.2
which means that cancellation at time 0 is indeed optimal for the seller. Theo-
rem 3.2(i) of Kifer (2013b) describes the construction of a function z0, also shown
in Figure 6, and gives the ask price as
z0(0) = −2 = pia1 (Y,X, Y ).
Note that Za0 is the epigraph of z0, reflected around the line x1 = x2; in other words,
Za0 would have been the epigraph of z0, had the currencies been ordered differently.
We will compare the dual representations for pia1 (Y,X, Y ) in Theorem 3.1 above
and Theorem 3.1 of Kifer (2013b). The model has only two stopping times, 0 and 1,
and so this can be done easily and directly. Observe also that
K∗0 = cone {(1, 10) , (1, 13)} ,
K∗u1 = cone {(1, 12)} ⊂ K∗0,
K∗d1 = cone {(1, 9)} .
This means (cf. Definition 2.2) that the property (P, S) =
(
P,
(
S1, S2
)) ∈ P¯1(χ) is
equivalent to
P(u) ≥ 13 , P(d) = 1− P(u) ≥ 0,
together with
S10 = S
1
1 = 1, 10 ≤ S20 ≤ 13, S21(u) = 12, S21(d) = 9.
For the representation for pia1 (Y,X, Y ) in Theorem 3.1, take first σ = 0. For
every χ ∈ X and (P, S) ∈ P¯1(χ ∧ 0) we have
(Q0· · S0∧·)χ = χ∗1X0 · S0 + χ0Y0 · S0 = −5χ0 − 15 + S20 ,
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and therefore
max
χ∈X
max
(P,S)∈P¯1(χ∧0)
EP((Q0· · S0∧·)χ)
= max{−5χ0 − 15 + S20 : χ0 ∈ [0, 1], S20 ∈ [10, 13]} = −2.
Similarly, for σ = 1,
(Q1· · S1∧·)χ = χ0Y0 · S0 + χ∗2X1 · S1 + χ1Y1 · S1 = χ0(S20 − 20)
and so
max
χ∈X
max
(P,S)∈P¯1(χ∧1)
EP((Q1· · S1∧·)χ)
= max{χ0(S20 − 20) : χ0 ∈ [0, 1], S20 ∈ [10, 13]} = 0. (5.2)
Finally,
min
σ∈T
max
χ∈X
max
(P,S)∈P¯1(χ∧σ)
EP((Qσ· · Sσ∧·)χ) = min{−2, 0} = −2 = pia1 (Y,X, Y )
as expected.
Now turn to the dual representation in Theorem 3.1 of Kifer (2013b). It can be
written in our notation as
V a := min
σ∈T
max
χ∈X
max
(P,S)∈P¯1(χ)
EP((Qσ· · S)χ),
where
(Qσ· · S)χ =
σ∑
t=0
χtYt · St +
T∑
t=σ+1
χtXσ · St
and T = 1. For σ = 1, the calculation (5.2) gives that
max
χ∈X
max
(P,S)∈P¯1(χ)
EP((Q1· · S)χ) = max
χ∈X
max
(P,S)∈P¯1(χ∧1)
EP((Q1· · S1∧·)χ) = 0.
For σ = 0 and every χ ∈ X and (P, S) ∈ P¯1(χ) we have
(Qσ· · S)χ = χ0Y0 · S0 + χ1X0 · S1 = χ0(S20 − 5) + (1− χ0)S21 − 15,
so that
EP((Q0· · S)χ) = χ0(S20 − 5) + (1− χ0)(3P(u) + 9)− 15.
This means that
max
χ∈X
max
(P,S)∈P¯1(χ)
EP((Q0· · S)χ)
= max{χ0(S20 − 5) + (1− χ0)(3P(u) + 9)− 15
: χ0 ∈ [0, 1], S20 ∈ [10, 13],P(u) ∈ [ 13 , 1]} = −3.
Finally,
V a = min{0,−3} = −3 6= pia1 (Y,X, Y ),
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which demonstrates that V a is not the correct dual representation for pia1 (Y,X, Y ).
Example 5.3. Consider a three-currency model with T steps and time horizon 1
based on the two-asset recombinant Korn-Muller model (Korn & Mu¨ller 2009) with
Cholesky decomposition, i.e. friction-free exchange rates in terms of currency 3 are
modelled by the process (St)
T
t=0, where
St =
(
ε1tS
1
t−1, ε
2
tS
2
t−1, 1
)
for t = 1, . . . , T
and (εt)
T
t=1 =
((
ε1t , ε
2
t
))T
t=1
is a sequence of independent identically distributed
random variables taking the values(
e−
1
2
σ2
1
∆−σ1
√
∆, e−
1
2
σ2
2
∆−(ρ+
√
1−ρ2)σ2
√
∆
)
,(
e−
1
2
σ2
1
∆−σ1
√
∆, e−
1
2
σ2
2
∆−(ρ−
√
1−ρ2)σ2
√
∆
)
,(
e−
1
2
σ2
1
∆+σ1
√
∆, e−
1
2
σ2
2
∆+(ρ−
√
1−ρ2)σ2
√
∆
)
,(
e−
1
2
σ2
1
∆+σ1
√
∆, e−
1
2
σ2
2
∆+(ρ+
√
1−ρ2)σ2
√
∆
)
,
each with positive probability, where ∆ := 1
T
is the step size. The exchange rates
with transaction costs are modelled as
piijt :=
{
S
j
t
Sit
(1 + k) if i 6= j,
1 if i = j,
for i, j = 1, . . . , 3 and t ≤ T , where k ∈ [0, 1). We take(
S10 , S
2
0
)
= (40, 50) , σ1 = 0.15, σ2 = 0.1, ρ = 0.5.
Consider a game put option with physical delivery on a basket containing one
unit each of currencies 1 and 2 and with strike K in currency 3, i.e.
Yt = (−1,−1,K) for t = 0, . . . , T.
On cancellation the seller delivers the above payoff to the buyer, together with a
cancellation penalty p ≥ 0 in currency 3, so that
Xt = X
′
t = (−1,−1,K + p) for t = 0, . . . , T.
We allow for the possibility that the seller may choose not to cancel the option, and
the buyer may choose not to exercise, by adding an additional time step T + 1 and
taking
YT+1 = XT+1 = X
′
T+1 = (0, 0, 0) .
Except for the union, the operations in Constructions 3.1 and 3.3, namely inter-
section and direct addition of a polyhedral cone, are standard geometric procedures
when applied to polyhedra, and can be implemented using existing software li-
braries. Both these operations are union-preserving, and so the extension to unions
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of polyhedra is straightforward. The numerical results below were produced using
Maple with the Convex package (Franz 2009).
Table 1 contains bid and ask prices in currency 3 of the basket put with penalty
p = 5 for a range of strike prices. Both bid and ask prices increase with the strike.
Note the appearance of negative bid and ask prices for out-of-the-money options
(i.e. K < S10 +S
2
0 = 90). The reason for this is that the seller can cancel the option
at any time, and cancellation tends to be particularly attractive to the seller (and
very costly for the buyer) when the option is far out of the money; for example,
if K = 80 then, from the point of view of the seller, cancelling the option at time
0 is equivalent to receiving the basket from the buyer and paying K + p = 85 in
currency 3, which is less than the market price S10 + S
2
0 = 90 (ignoring transaction
costs) of the basket.
Table 1. Bid and ask prices of game basket put option with
N = 10, p = 5 and different strikes K, Example 5.3
k = 0 k = 0.005
K pib
3
pia
3
pib
3
pia
3
100 10.043290 11.033942 9.568590 11.687749
95 5.266479 6.817389 4.706543 7.480028
90 0.967824 2.774598 0.367975 3.423798
85 −2.934360 −1.091048 −3.587214 −0.444708
80 −6.910514 −5.131149 −7.584034 −4.614029
Bid and ask prices of the game basket put with strike K = 100 and a range
of penalty values are reported in Table 2, together with bid and ask prices of the
American basket put with the same strike (using the constructions of Roux &
Zastawniak 2015). In practical terms, game options with large penalties resemble
American options (because larger penalties make it less attractive for the seller to
cancel the option early), and this explains the convergence of the bid and ask prices
of the game option to that of the American option as the penalty increases.
Table 2. Bid and ask prices of game basket put option with N =
10, K = 100 and different penalties, Example 5.3
k = 0 k = 0.005
p pib
3
pia
3
pib
3
pia
3
0 10.000000 10.000000 9.550000 10.447761
1 10.014709 10.278348 9.556726 10.790910
2 10.027095 10.497310 9.562075 11.051351
5 10.043290 11.033942 9.568590 11.687749
10 10.050958 11.571315 9.571850 12.297913
20 10.052026 11.796921 9.572414 12.575621
American 10.052027 11.812658 9.572414 12.589930
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